Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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EXDIS; GENEVA FOR G. JOHNSON

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM US UK UR

SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: BRITISH ROLE IN SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT

1. UK EMBASSY MINISTER ROBINSON CALLED ON ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE APRIL 7 TO PRESENT BRITISH VIEWS ON UK ROLE IN SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. HE SAID BRITISH MINISTERS HAD CONCLUDED THAT UK (A) SHOULD BECOME A SIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT; (B) SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION; (C) SHOULD CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL TO US TEAMS MAINTAINING INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS AND CARRYING OUT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON SOVIET TERRITORY; AND (D) MEET ALL BRITISH PERSONNEL COSTS. (TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE
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PROVIDED BELOW.) ROBINSON ASKED FOR EARLY RESPONSE SO THAT AGREED US-UK POSITION COULD BE PRESENTED TO SOVIETS WHEN CTB TALKS RESUME.

2. WARNKE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WANT TO STUDY THE UK IDEAS BEFORE PROVIDING A CONSIDERED REPLY, HE COULD OFFER SOME PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT USG,

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FOR ITS PART, WOULD HAVE INTEREST IN BROAD UK ROLE IN SEPARATE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT UK PERSONNEL WOULD MAKE VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO TREATY VERIFICATION. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS COULD WELL HAVE OBJECTIONS TO THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION ENVISAGED IN THE UK APPROACH. OVERRIDING WESTERN OBJECTIVE WAS TO ACHIEVE BEST POSSIBLE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID PROPOSALS THAT COULD DECREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR MEETING THAT OBJECTIVE.

3. WARNKE RECALLED MARCH 21 RESTRICTED TRILATERAL MEETING IN GENEVA, WHERE SOVIET REP MOROKHOV SAID THAT BRITISH WOULD HAVE TO PAY AN EQUAL PRICE FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND CITED THE IDEA OF ISIS ON UK TERRITORY (CTB MESSAGE NO. 186). WARNKE QUESTIONED WHETHER SOVIETS REALLY WANTED THE BRITISH TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY FORM. HE FELT THAT SOVIET TACTIC MIGHT BE TO RAISE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO UK PARTICIPATION, AND SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IF THOSE MENTIONED BY MOROKHOV ON MARCH 21 COULD BE OVERCOME. HE BELIEVED THAT SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN AVOIDING ANY POSSIBILITY OF BEING SUBJECTED TO TWICE AS MUCH VERIFICATION AS EITHER THE US OR UK.

4. WARNKE SAID THAT US AND UK SHOULD TRY TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH THAT WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO STIMULATE A NEGATIVE
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SOVIET REACTION AND THUS TO JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A GOOD SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IDEA OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN US ISI AND OSI TEAMS SEEMED TO BE A PRACTICAL APPROACH, WHICH WOULD NOT RAISE SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT "DOUBLE JEOPARDY". FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY UK ALSO SEEMED PRACTICAL AND WORKABLE. HOWEVER, IDEA OF UK PARTICIPATION IN JCC COULD WELL CREATE REAL DIFFICULTIES. WARNKE SAID THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VERY SATISFIED WITH THE TYPE OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT THAT EXISTS IN THE SALT SCC, AND MAY WISH TO USE THAT ARRANGEMENT AS A MODEL FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. PERHAPS THERE WAS SOME WAY OF FORMULATING A JCC PROVISION THAT WOULD ENABLE THE UK TO PARTICIPATE WHEN THERE IS REASON FOR IT TO DO SO, BUT THAT WOULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIETS PROBLEMS.

5. ROBINSON THANKED WARNKE FOR HIS PRELIMINARY REMARKS. HE INDICATED THAT, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" WERE CONCERNED, THE IDEA OF MAKING BRITISH PERSONNEL PARTICIPANTS ON US ISI AND OSI TEAMS SHOULD SATISFY THEM. HE ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE IDEA, CONTAINED IN THE BRITISH NOTE, THAT AN APPROPRIATE PRO-

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VISION COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO ASSURE THE SOVIETS THAT THE UK ROLE WOULD ONLY BE IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE US.

6. WARNKE POINTED OUT THAT UPCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW WOULD NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO BE READY TO RESUME CTB TALKS ON APRIL 19 AS SCHEDULED. HE SAID THAT WE FAVORED POST-

PONEMENT UNTIL MAY 3 AND ASKED IF THIS DATE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HMG. ROBINSON MAINTAINED THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS, HE DOUBTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE POSTPONEMENT, BUT OFFERED TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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7. BEGIN TEXT OF UK NOTE:

BRITISH MINISTERS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD BECOME A SIGNATORY TO THE SEPARATE VERIFI-CATION AGREEMENT AND BE FULLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER IT. THIS WOULD BE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ON THE LINES INDICATED TO DR. PRESS DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST FEBRUARY, I.E., THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ASK HMG TO CONTRIBUTE TO US EXPENDITURE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BUT WOULD OF COURSE EXPECT HMG TO MEET ALL THE COSTS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR PERSONNEL.

MINISTERS THEREFORE CONSIDER THAT HMG SHOULD:

(A) BE A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION;

(B) CONTRIBUTE BRITISH PERSONNEL TO AMERICAN TEAMS MAINTAINING INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISI) AND CARRYING OUT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (OSI);

(C) REASSURE THE SOVIET UNION, IF NECESSARY WITH AN APPROPRIATE PROVISION IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSI AND ISI PROVISIONS WOULD BE ONLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT;

(D) MEET ALL BRITISH PERSONNEL COSTS.

WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE SO THAT AN AGREED POSITION ON PARTICIPATION BY HMG IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT CAN BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS

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RESUME ON 19 APRIL. WE SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE. END TEXT. VANCE

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